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Much of thhe national annd transnationnal effort to deevelop accounntability in thee development and applicattion
of sciencee and technoloogy focuses on
o multinational corporationns (MNCs) beecause they are one of the
primary chhannels for traansnational diffusion and use
u of new devvelopments inn applied scieence, new
inventionss, and new tecchnologies or combinationss of technologgies around thhe world. Conntemporary
multinational corporatioons consist of a “parent com
mpany” incorpporated in onee country and its local brannch
offices or subsidiary coompanies incoorporated or reegistered undder the laws off the country w
where they
b the parent through owneership of the sstock and provision of the ttop managem
ment
operate buut controlled by
personnell.
Before thee 19th century most businessses were fam
mily ventures, and firms witth extensive ccross-border
transactions often sent family membbers or close associates
a
ab road to look aafter the firm’ss interests. M
MNCs
in their current form devveloped only after the moddern idea of orrganizing businesses as coorporations –
f
the peopple owning theem – was adoopted in the 17th and 18th
entities wiith a legal stattus separate from
centuries. The great European monopoly trading companies – such as the Dutch East Inndia Companyy, the
British East India Comppany or the Frrench North America
A
Comppany – were pproto-multinattionals: they
maintained trading officces to buy gooods in Asia, raan their own sshipping fleetss (opening theeir ships to others’
a sold goodds to customeers in Europe. However, thheir offices weere
cargos whhen space was available), and
not established as sepaarate compannies elsewheree because corporate form had not been adopted in other
e
in thhe early 19th ccentury. Britissh banks and
parts of thhe world. Thee MNCs familiaar today first emerged
insurance companies had
h branches in the USA annd South Ameerica by 18255, Swiss firms set up textile
factories in southern Geermany in thee 1830s, Britissh gold miningg companies oowned mines in Brazil befoore
A
railw
way pioneers owned separaate railroad coompanies in C
Central and S
South
1820, andd British and American
America inn the 1850s. By 1914, therre were severral thousand m
manufacturingg multinationaals and hundreeds
of mining or plantation multinationalss. The links between
b
multi national firmss and Europeaan colonial em
mpire
c
after 18770 because many
m
of the baanking and mining multinatiionals operateed in their hom
me
became close
country’s colonies. Maanufacturing multinationals
m
developed a vvery different pattern, prefeerring to locatte
factories in other relativvely wealthy countries
c
where there was ssufficient custtomer base foor their produccts.
Thus, the German firm Siemens undd Halske openned a factory iin Russia in 1855, while thee US-based S
Singer
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Multinational Corporations in Transnational Accountability
Sewing Machine Company set up European production in Scotland in 1867. In 1914, the assets owned by
multinational corporations comprised approximately one-third of all foreign investment in the world; the
other two-thirds was bank loans to foreign customers or investor purchases of bonds (also a form of loan)
issued by companies or governments in another country.
19th century political conditions shaped the spread of multinationals in several ways. The idea of
establishing state-owned factories was dormant at this time. The older royal arsenals and workshops of
Europe were not the sources of industrial development, and British experience set up the model of privately
owned firms leading the way. Direct colonial rule or indirect influence through the economic importance of
European lenders and firms meant that the multinational corporation’s home government could ensure
favorable conditions for activity in most parts of the world. Manufacturers, who could have supplied foreign
customers from their home country, often expanded to other relatively wealthy countries to get around
tariffs by establishing factories that would count as “local producers.” Critics of MNCs also arose in the late
19th and early 20th but, unlike today, focused on use of multinational operations to keep profits high through
moves to low-wage areas rather than the impact of their day-to-day operations for people or the
environment.1
The extent of multinational enterprise shrank between 1920 and 1945 under the impact of World Wars,
which disrupted international trade and investment patterns, and the Great Depression, which reduced
economic activity in general. Losses of foreign assets to the allies (for German companies) and to Soviet
nationalizations (for Belgian and French companies) soured them on foreign investment. The Great
Depression led to fracturing of the world into separate currency blocs which hindered international trade,
and rising nationalism made foreign-owned companies targets in many countries. Companies still
collaborated, but now preferred doing so through international cartels in which separate companies agree
on pricing and division of markets among themselves rather than through direct ownership. Only in mining,
where companies typically sought to integrate all phases of operation from initial extraction through
processing, through sales of metals or materials to customers, did multinational organization persist at pre1914 levels.
During the 1920-1945 period political conditions were also far less favorable to multinational firms.
Governments sought to deal with the Great Depression through currency controls and higher tariffs, which
made trade and investment difficult. Revolutionary governments in Mexico and Russia took over foreignowned assets in mining, oil, railways, and (in Russia) manufacturing to make them into state-owned
enterprises. The Mexican program of having state ownership of leading sectors foreshadowed many of the
post-World War II policies in Western Europe and the Third World, and in rejecting investor claims to
compensation for their property sounded theme of redress for prior exploitation by foreign-owned business
that would be raised again in the 1950s and 1960s as the governments of as newly-independent former
colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia sought to escape foreign economic influence and direct their
country’s economy towards industrialization in their own way. However, Lenin and Stalin’s program in
Russia/the USSR attracted the most attention in the 1920s and 1930s because it was part of an effort to
entirely replace private ownership and price-setting in markets with state ownership and central planning.

Reformist and revolutionary Marxist forms of this argument appeared in John Hobson, Imperialism (1902) and V.I. Lenin,
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917) respectively.
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Multinational Corporations in Transnational Accountability
After a slow post-World War II start, the sustained growth of North American, Japanese, and Western
European economies in the 1950s and 1960s created new opportunities for business. The governments of
the leading Western industrial countries moved decisively to establish open international markets by
dismantling most of the protectionist measures adopted during the interwar period. This reduced the tariffbased motivations for MNC operations, but many companies still wanted to have production sites close to
their customers. The combination of renewed MNC activity in industrial states and the reduction of MNC
activity in developing states as many of the governments there nationalized the foreign mining, plantation,
and railway firms established in the colonial era meant that in 1980 nearly two-thirds of total foreign direct
investment was concentrated in the USA, Canada, and Western Europe.2 Meanwhile, the Soviet
government sought to develop a distinct socialist bloc economy through the Council for Mutual Economic
Cooperation while the communists’ 1949 victory in China closed another large part of the world to foreign
companies.
The oil crisis-induced recessions of the early 1970s and early 1980s slowed economic activity, and with it
MNC growth. Yet, some of the roots of later expansion of MNC activity were laid in this period. The
American pattern of tighter coordination and global planning between parent company and subsidiaries was
adopted by Western European and other MNCs. MNCs also became more willing to enter into joint
ventures (co-owned firms) with governments or local investors, and many governments of developing
countries became more willing to have manufacturing MNCs come into the country. The contrasting
development performance of East Asian economies, with their government-encouraged policies of
competing on global markets, over Latin American economies, with their continuing emphasis on replacing
imports with locally made goods induced a broad rethinking of development strategy. This rethinking was
reinforced as more data about Soviet and Chinese economic performance became available and indicated
that central planners in both countries were finding it difficult to cope with the economic ramifications of the
computer age.
Though the volume of international trade as a percentage of global production returned to 1914 levels by
the mid 1970s, the value of all direct foreign investment did not reach its 1914 level of 9% of the value of
annual world production until the late 1990s.3 Only with the end of the Cold war and the opening of all
parts of the world to foreign trade and investment did the level of MNC investment get back to what it had
been. Yet, the distribution of activities was very different; MNCs were far more active in manufacturing and
service industries than they had been in 1914, and less active in raw materials and provision of
transportation or public utilities. The home countries of MNCs also became more diverse. In the mid1960s, US firms made more than 80% of direct foreign investments.4 More European companies took up
multinational activity in the 1970s. In the 1980s Japanese manufacturers joined the older general trading
companies in direct foreign investment, either to get closer to customers or to take advantage of lower cost
labor in Southeast Asia. The more successful developing countries also became home to multinational
firms of their own.
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In 1992, the total equaled 8.5% of that year’s world production. Jones 1996
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M. Wilkins. 1974. The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
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Although most people think of giant firms like Exxon, Royal Dutch Shell, Nike, or Nestle when they hear the
term “multinational corporation," any business firm operating simultaneously in more than one country
through its own subsidiaries or branches qualifies as an MNC. These subsidiaries might run their own
factories, like Toyota USA’s factory in California; they might operate retail stores, like London-based Body
Shop’s stores in major US cities; they might be franchise operations, like the many MacDonald’s outside
the USA, or they might be wholesalers abroad, like Coca-Cola’s bottling companies. Though the largest
MNCs have annual sales exceeding the gross national products of most countries of the world, others are
fairly small firms that link some or all of the various segments of production (product design, materials
acquisition, fabrication) and distribution (shipping, delivery to wholesale or retail customers) across national
borders.
Though MNCs attract a lot of attention, it is important to remember that companies can engage in
international trade and investment without becoming MNCs. Any company can buy materials or parts from
suppliers in a different country, much as US bicycle makers buy derailleurs and other components from
Shimano in Japan or Campagnolo in Italy. Any company can sell all or part of their production to
wholesalers and retail customers in other countries or borrow money from a foreign bank. Yet, there is one
pattern of trade between firms that seems to blur the distinction between MNCs and other firms. When the
contracts between a firm and its suppliers include detailed specification of the type, design, and quality of
goods to be produced, the line between dealing “at arm’s length” with a different independent company and
dealing “in house” with another branch of the same company breaks down. When the buying company is
well-known and its brands are put on the goods, environmental, labor and other activists concerned about
practices in the suppliers’ factories often put pressure on the better known buyer to add stipulations about
respect for labor rights or protection of the environment to the supply contracts.
MNCs (and business firms generally) want to operate in a cultural, social, economic, and political context
that facilitates their activity and makes it easier (or at least no more difficult) for them to attain their goals.
Whatever sort of good or service a company produces, its main goal is to earn profits by having an income
from sales that exceeds its total expenses. This can lead to a narrow focus on the economic activity and
the short to immediate term. Advocates of corporate social responsibility have urged companies to adopt a
broader focus and a longer time horizon by adopting a “triple bottom line” concerned with people (respect
for human rights and human dignity), planet (ecological sustainability), and profit (economic viability within
the bounds of ethical conduct). Yet, profit remains the most important of the three for managers and
investors because a company – whether behaving very ethically, very unethically, or somewhere in
between – that does not earn more than it spends will not survive very long.
Any company – whether an MNC operating in several countries around the world or a locally-oriented firm –
looking for ways to make additional money can look in three directions. It can continue with the same lines
of business but expand their volume of production (“scale up”) by adding new factories, hiring additional
workers, and buying more materials and parts if there appears to be unsatisfied demand for the goods or
services it currently provides. If there is not much additional demand, it can search “horizontally” or
“vertically” for opportunities to earn more by integrating new activities into firm operations. Horizontal
integration involves taking up opportunities in related lines of business. Thus, a chemical company initially
producing plastics might decide that it can also produce synthetic fibers, or a beer brewer owning a large
enough spring might decide to add bottled water to its product line. Vertical integration involves looking for
opportunities along the production and distribution chain from acquisition of materials through sales to final
users. Thus, a clothing company that initially bought cloth from textile manufacturers, made clothes, and

4

Multinational Corporations in Transnational Accountability
then sold the clothes to wholesalers might decide to acquire its own textile factory, its own retail stores, or
both. Whether and how far a company will go in vertical or horizontal expansion depends on its
calculations of the net benefit. If it would cost a lot to extend activity to other products because the
equipment is expensive or properly trained workers hard to hire and retain, or continuing in arm’s length
relations with suppliers and wholesalers looks more profitable than bringing those operations in-house, the
company will keep to its current industry or place in the production and distribution chain. If however,
activities in a related business or in a different part of the supply chain appear likely to enhance the firm’s
overall prospects, it will expand vertically or horizontally. The possibilities are outlined using a hypothetical
chemical company in Figure 1.

vertical integration
(expansion across steps in production chain)

Figure 1. Integration possibilities for hypothetical firm “ChemCo”
currently producing synthetic fibers sold to textile makers
horizontal integration
(expansion across sector divides)

plastics

synthetic fibers

waterproof coatings

retail sales
wholesale sales
finished goods assembly

(e.g., shirts)

components assembly

(e.g., cloth)

materials processing
raw or basic materials

“ChemCo”

The relative benefits of expanding or contracting company activity change over time, giving actual MNC
decisions a dynamic easily missed by those who believe that business always regards “bigger as better.”
In the 1980s, management experts who advised focusing on “core competencies” were claiming that
companies would profit most if they limited their activity to the particular goods or services they could
produce most profitably and sold off parts of the business doing other things. In biotechnology in the 1990s
and 2000s, in contrast, many firms were busy expanding, either through buying other companies or
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entering into long-term contracts. There were so many mergers that one analyst predicted approximately
half a dozen “food clusters” would dominate world processed food production within a few decades.5
Businesses do not operate in a vacuum. Managers know that they face and must to some extent address
the concerns of both internal and external stakeholders. “Internal” stakeholders are those inside the firm –
owners (shareholders), managers, and workers. Until recently, particularly in the “Anglo-American” model
of “shareholder capitalism,” they received the most attention. Managers run the company as agents for the
owners, and deal with workers as a distinct group – sometimes through labor unions and collective
bargaining, sometimes not, but always in a context of laws and regulations on workplace safety, wages,
hours, and related matters. “External” stakeholders are those outside the firm. For many, particularly
advocates of the German “social market” model, the external stakeholders are residents of the communities
in which the firm operates. They are certainly important as they will feel the effects of pollution or pollutionmitigation, firm hiring or firm layoffs, and the opening or closing of major production or distribution facilities
employing large numbers of people. However, external stakeholders also include a firm’s suppliers and
customers, and the local, subnational and national governments of the countries where they operate.
They, too, are affected by firm success or failure. As “corporate social responsibility” has become a more
prominent concern, thinking about the needs of these various stakeholders has become more explicit.
Companies operate in societies where other members also want favorable conditions for their own activity
and some protection from the impact of companies’ activities on their own lives. Government regulation is
a fact of social life, but it can protect as well as limit companies. Companies need secure rights of
ownership and use over their property, access to materials and supplies, access to customers, and
assistance in enforcing contracts and settling disputes. Yet, the kinds of regulation a particular company
will accept – or even ask for – depends on the type of activity it undertakes. Fishing companies running
factory ships on the world’s oceans do not need exclusive rights to operate in a particular part of the ocean;
what they want is permission to look for fish all around the ocean and clear property rights to their ships
and the fish they catch. Oil and gas companies, in contrast, want exclusive rights to operate in a particular
location because the pool of oil stays in one place and they have to build expensive equipment to get to the
oil. If another company comes along and drills a well too close to the first, it could take away enough oil to
keep the first from paying off its investment in the equipment; thus oil companies want protection against
others setting up in the same place. Companies that have to spend a lot of money on product research
and development want strong patent systems and other protection of intellectual property so they can sell
enough of whatever they develop to recover their R&D costs as well as their production costs. In contrast,
patents giving exclusive right to develop products from an invention are less important than the trademarks
and brands that distinguish one company’s goods from another’s for companies using well-known
technologies to produce everyday goods like towels, tennis balls, or hammers.
[Note to instructors: The following section is to be used when cases deal with biotechnology]
The particular dynamics in Biotechnology
Applying current scientific advances in chemistry, biochemistry, genetics, and requires particularly large
amounts of R&D work, and companies operating in those areas want very strong protection of patents and
5
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trade secrets. At the same time, members of the public want strong assurance that any products allowed
on the market will be safe for humans and animals and non-disruptive to the natural environment. The
tensions between competing concerns can be seen very well in the relation among firms developing
genetically modified plant or animal organisms, potential customers and others in society, and the
government. For instance, developers of genetically modified (GM) plants begin with an idea and initially
work on it inside enclosed laboratories. At this stage, regulators worry primarily about the safety of
laboratory conditions for those working inside and the precautions taken in lab facility design and operation
to ensure that what is inside stays inside. GM organism developers cannot go directly from lab testing to
distribution of a new seed or plant stock; they need to grow the plant through more than one generation to
assess how the modification affects the plant over time. Some of these growth experiments can occur in
labs, but others can only be completed in outdoor fields. The move outdoors shifts the regulators’ attention
to the more difficult task of ensuring the lowest risk of contamination to nearby areas. Once the GM plant is
proven stable and able to perform as expected in resisting pests, blight, drought, or other unfavorable
conditions, the developer will want to introduce it to farmers and, through their crops, into the animal or
human food supply. This shifts the regulators’ focus yet again, to the safety of consuming the new variety
of food. Each shift in focus expands the circle of people directly affected.
The changes in the circle of people affected and the focus of regulations is summarized in this table:

Stage of GMO development
First
– turning idea into invention
Second
– turning invention into useful
product

Third
– allowing new product to be
sold

Circle of affected parties
Lab workers, immediate
neighbors
Lab and field workers,
persons, animals, plants in
locations close enough to
be affected by escape of
seeds or plant parts from
fields used for outdoor
trials
Production workers,
product handlers,
buyers/users, neighbors of
users, ultimate consumers
of products containing GM
organisms

Focus of Regulations
Risk management

Risk management

Risk Management
Product Safety
Safety of Use
Facilitation of commerce

However, debate about the safety of a potential new product begins well before a company seeks
permission to offer it for sale. Growing awareness development begins long before a product comes to
market has led members of the public, particularly environmental and other activists skeptical of GM
technology, to pay attention much earlier in the process.
7
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In the lab development and outdoor trials phases, regulations address risk management. Decisions reflect
not only the state of scientific and technological knowledge but also the level of public trust or distrust of
genetic modification techniques and/or the motives of those engaged in developing them. Genetic
modification in the 2000s is in some ways the chemicals of the 1980s – not only an area of disagreement
about the best approach to the products themselves but also one of the major fields of contention between
advocates and critics of private enterprise, market economics, and corporate activities. In the 1980s,
several major chemical spills focused public attention on chemical companies of all sorts, from the largest
MNC to the smallest local garage workshop; and large segments of the public became convinced that
chemical companies were ignoring hazards, failing to inform government agencies or neighbors adequately
of risks and response measures, and generally carrying on without proper regard for the safety and health
of employees and neighbors. Seeking to avoid what many regarded as the “close the gate after the horse
has bolted” character of chemical regulation, activists began efforts to de-legitimate GM foods in the eyes
of the public before any had moved from lab to field trial. These efforts were greatly assisted by a political
climate that emphasized human rights more strongly and was marked by a proliferation of environmental
NGOs and social movements deeply skeptical of individual large corporations, oligopolistic industries, and
governments’ ability or willingness to decree and enforce regulations industry opposes.
These efforts were most successful in Europe, where industry disarray combined with stronger
countervailing influences from Green Parties and others led to adoption of a process focused regulatory
approach based on stricter readings of the precautionary principle. As European realized the different
balance of pressures in the USA was allowing industry more influence, European activists sought to
promote wider adoption of similar views among US environmental and social activists. They and local GM
skeptics had some success, but not enough to prevent adoption of a more end product oriented regulatory
approach in the USA. This more permissive climate for initial experimenting and field trials then influenced
the European arguments as European firms, now more united in their preferences and better organized for
discussions with officials as policy is being developed, argued that the EU’s process oriented approach to
regulation was leaving it at a competitive disadvantage with US and Asian firms.
If and when a GM plant or animal is permitted into general agriculture, regulation must also address
product safety, safe usage, and facilitation of commerce. While product developers have the primary
responsibility for product safety, even a safe product can pose hazards if used incorrectly, so users must be
informed about safe uses, warned against hazardous ones, and informed of measures they can take
should dangers develop. These, like risk management, address potential problems and avoidance of harm.
Like risk reduction rules, these tend to be enforced through liability law and regarded by companies as a
potential burden. Regulations facilitating commerce, such as creation and enforcement of intellectual
property rights in GM organisms, and the range of market regulation measures that provide a stable context
for taking out loans, securing insurance, and buying or selling, are regarded by companies as facilitators.
Left to themselves (as guided by their need to make some profit so they can cover costs, repay lenders and
provide returns for investors), most companies want regulations that facilitate commerce while leaving them
wide latitude of discretion on risk management. Consumers also want a stable commercial climate, but
insist increasingly on good risk management and consideration of the long-term environmental impact of
GM products.
Thus the content and extent of government regulation regarding development and introduction of GM
organisms depends on the balance between various social groups. Industry typically has several
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advantages in the political contest: the relatively large size of the benefits or losses they will experience
from different types of regulation motivates them to get involved in the issue and the relatively small
number of companies (typically in the hundreds if all firms are considered; less than 100 if only the big firms
are considered) makes is relatively easy for them to organize industry associations for joint political activity.
They typically prefer what political scientists call “insider strategies” for gaining influence – making
presentations to individual legislators or other officials (“lobbying”) or supporting preferred candidates with
campaign contributions. Segments of the public, whether focused on themselves as consumers,
environmentalists, or some other group, usually have greater difficulty organizing because they are more
numerous and typically enjoy relatively small gains or losses from different regulations. These barriers can
be overcome through mass membership organizations and/or activist campaigns. Mass membership
consumer or environmental organizations often engage in lobbying and encourage their members to
support particular candidates. Activist campaigns, whether run by mass membership organizations or other
groups, sometimes engage in “outsider strategies” as well as, seeking to influence political decisions
through stirring up public controversy sufficient to make politicians and regulators pay attention and
accommodate the concerns expressed.
Debates over GM organisms combine arguments about the application of a technology and the
environmental impact of human activities. In both areas, appeals to scientific evidence are a typical part of
the policy debate. Companies seeking permission to develop and then sell GM organisms and groups
opposing development or sale (whether of all GM organisms or of a particular one) all appeal to laboratory
and field studies of the safety and effects of GM organisms. Yet, none fully shares the commitment to
rigorous methodologies, consciously seeking to prevent initial hypotheses and other beliefs from so
dominating analysis that contrary observational data is ignored, and openness to correction that
characterize the best scientific research. Many participants in the GM organisms debate let their prior
assumptions about safety or danger of GM organisms color interpretation of data or selection of the
particular studies to highlight and engage in a good deal of personal attack against those not sharing their
views. Scientific expertise can be used to challenge the most exaggerated arguments for or against, and
perhaps limit the impact of the personal attacks, but policy decisions will be driven mainly by social and
economic concerns rather than science.
<end>
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